The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law by Mills, A
 1 
The Dimensions of Public Policy  
in Private International Law 
 
Alex Mills* 
 
Accepted version: Published in (2008) 4 Journal of Private International Law 201 
 
1 The problem of public policy in private international law 
National courts always retain the power to refuse to apply a foreign law or recognise 
or enforce a foreign judgment on the grounds of inconsistency with public policy. The 
law which would ordinarily be applicable under choice of law rules may, for example, 
be denied application where it is “manifestly incompatible with the public policy 
(‘ordre public’) of the forum”1, and a foreign judgment may be refused recognition on 
the grounds that, for example, “such recognition is manifestly contrary to public 
policy in the [state] in which recognition is sought”2. The existence of such a 
discretion is recognised in common law rules, embodied in statutory codifications of 
private international law3, including those operating between European states 
otherwise bound by principles of mutual trust, and is a standard feature of 
international conventions on private international law4. It has even been suggested 
that it is a general principle of law which can thus be implied in private international 
law treaties which are silent on the issue5.  
 
The public policy exception is not only ubiquitous6, but also a fundamentally 
important element of modern private international law. As a ‘safety net’ to choice of 
law rules and rules governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, 
it is a doctrine which crucially defines the outer limits of the ‘tolerance of difference’ 
implicit in those rules7. This is a function which it has long performed8, and which is 
increasingly important in multicultural societies and a globalising world. In addition 
                                                 
* Slaughter and May Lecturer in Law, Selwyn College, University of Cambridge 
(alexmills@cantab.net). Thank you to the anonymous referees and to Kimberley Trapp for their helpful 
comments. An early version of this paper was presented at the Journal of Private International Law 
Conference in Birmingham, June 2007. 
1 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 
1980, Consolidated at OJ C 027, 26.1.1998 (henceforth, “Rome Convention (1980)”), Art.16. 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, OJ L 12, 16.1.2001 (henceforth, 
“Brussels Regulation (2001)”), Art.34(1). 
3 See, eg, Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, s.14(3)(a)(i). 
4 See, eg, Mosconi, F, “Exceptions to the Operation of Choice of Law Rules” (1989-V) 217 Recueil des 
Cours 9 at p.44ff. 
5 See Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v 
Sweden) [1958] ICJ Reports 55, particularly the Separate Opinions of Judges Badawi, Lauterpacht, and 
Quintana and the Declaration of Judge Spiropoulos. Judge Lauterpacht held (at p.92) that “ordre public 
must be regarded as a general principle of law”. But see Lipstein, K, “The Hague Conventions on 
Private International Law, Public Law and Public Policy” (1959) 8 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 506. 
6 This is not to imply that it is homogenous – see further section 2.2 below. 
7 Note the resolution of the Institute of International Law on “Cultural differences and ordre public in 
family private international law” (2005) 
(http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_02_en.pdf). 
8 See further, eg, Mills, A, “The Private History of International Law” (2006) 55 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at pp.13, 36, 40. 
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to this traditional role, recent cases suggest an expansion in the use of public policy 
derived from sources external to the state, such as European and international law, a 
development which quietly suggests a revolutionary change in its character and 
effects. 
 
However, public policy exceptions in private international law have also been 
frequently criticised for their uncertainty9. This is particularly true in the common law 
world, and the focus of analysis in this article will be on the position of public policy 
under English law10. The criticisms break down into two distinct but related concerns. 
First, the exercise of public policy is often characterised and maligned as involving a 
broad and unfettered discretion, giving excessive and unguided power to the judiciary. 
Second, critics point out that when the courts do decide to apply public policy it is not 
always easy to identify in advance what the content of public policy actually is or 
what the consequences of its application will be. The objections raised here are to the 
unpredictability of the rule, which, aside from raising concerns about rationality and 
legitimacy, risks undermining the concern of private international law, particularly in 
the common law world, with meeting party expectations.  
 
The courts in practice acknowledge that there must be limits on the application of 
public policy in private international law, accepting the need for a cautious approach, 
avoiding “national exclusiveness and prejudice impatient of the application of foreign 
law”11. English courts have noted that “the court will be even slower to invoke public 
policy in the field of conflict of laws than when a purely municipal legal issue is 
involved”12, and have accepted the need for “commonsense, good manners, and a 
reasonable tolerance”13, “the greatest circumspection”14, and “judicial restraint”15, 
noting that “the law proceeds charily where grounds of public policy are invoked”16. 
They have not, however, provided guidelines on how to formulate the limits on the 
application of public policy in private international law, lamenting its “imprecision, 
even vagueness”17 but accepting that the “public policy principle eludes more precise 
definition”18. This does not merely mean that the decisions of the courts are 
unpredictable, but also that it is very difficult to find satisfactory reasons to criticise 
any application of public policy. 
                                                 
9 Possible exceptions may be admitted for principles deriving from public policy which have 
crystallised into distinct rules of private international law (such as the defences of fraud and natural 
justice which operate against the recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment), or have been 
adopted in statute as mandatory rules of the forum, thus overriding the ordinary application of foreign 
law. These are not considered in this article. 
10 The relative underdevelopment of English rules of public policy is often attributed to the dominance 
of the lex fori in English law in matters dealing with family law or personal status, where many civil 
law systems would apply the law of common nationality of the parties, giving a greater role to public 
policy exceptions: but see Enonchong, N, “Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws: A Chinese Wall 
Around Little England?” (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 633 at p.637ff. 
11 Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v 
Sweden) [1958] ICJ Reports 55 at 94 (Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht). 
12 Vervaeke v Smith [1983] 1 AC 145 at 164. 
13 Cheni v Cheni [1965] P 85 at 99; see also KC & Anor v City of Westminster Social & Community 
Services Dept & Anor [2008] EWCA Civ 198. 
14 Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co & Anor [2002] UKHL 19 at [18], per Lord Nichols. 
15 Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co & Anor [2002] UKHL 19 at [140], per Lord Hope. 
16 Cheni v Cheni [1965] P 85 at 97. 
17 Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co & Anor [2002] UKHL 19 at [18], per Lord Nichols. 
18 Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co & Anor [2002] UKHL 19 at [17], per Lord Nichols. 
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These concerns with uncertainty may be collectively summarised in the famous 
aphorism that public policy “is a very unruly horse and when once you get astride it 
you never know where it will carry you”19. Lord Denning responded with his own 
characteristically lyrical assertion, that:  
 
“With a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can 
jump over obstacles. It can leap the fences put up by fictions and come down on 
the side of justice”20. 
 
This article addresses the question of why and how public policy is or ought to be 
‘reined in’. It begins by addressing the theoretical question of why there should be 
limits on public policy, recognising the importance of constitutional concerns. Taking 
the view that the use of public policy must be restricted, it then develops three distinct 
principles or guidelines to explain and constrain the way in which public policy is, 
and ought to be, applied by the courts. These guidelines may be understood as 
constraints upon public policy operating in different ‘dimensions’. Using these 
constraints as parameters, it is possible to produce a ‘map’ of the principled 
application of public policy in private international law. Analysis of English case law 
reveals that, despite the lack of guidelines articulated by the courts, in practice the 
application of public policy largely corresponds to this principled map. The analysis 
in this article thus does not propose radical changes in the application of public policy 
in private international law, but rather attempts to explicate the unarticulated 
principles behind the practice of the courts. In doing so, it suggests ways in which the 
explanation and justification for the application of public policy might be improved, 
in the hope of influencing judicial practice and allaying the criticisms of uncertainty 
attached to this important doctrine. 
 
 
2 Why should there be limits on public policy in private 
international law? 
A preliminary question is to ask whether, and if so why, there should be limits on 
public policy in private international law at all, or whether it might properly be 
viewed as ‘discretionary’ in character. On this question it is necessary first and 
foremost to avoid confusion between two types of discretion – discretion for the state 
and discretion for the judge21.  
                                                 
19 Richardson v Mellish [1824] 2 Bing 229 at 252. 
20 Enderby Town Football Club Ltd v The Football Association Ltd [1971] 1 All ER 215 at 219. 
21 An issue famously considered by Cardozo J in Loucks v Standard Oil Co of New York (1918) 224 
NY 99 at 110: 
“The sovereign in its discretion may refuse its aid to the foreign right … . From this it has been 
an easy step to the conclusion that a like freedom of choice has been confided to the courts. But 
that, of course, is a false view. The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the 
pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close 
their doors unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent 
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.” 
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2.1 Distinguishing state and judicial discretion 
It is generally considered that private international law rules are discretionary for each 
state, that (in the absence of a binding treaty) public international law imposes no 
significant restrictions on private international law22. Such a perspective, connected to 
the ‘local law’ theory of private international law23, proceeds from the observation 
that “private international law is really a branch of municipal law”24. From this 
perspective, choice of law rules and rules governing the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments are discretionary for the local legal system – optional, serving 
domestic policy objectives, and subject only to internal political constraints25. 
 
Even if private international law possesses a discretionary character at the 
international level, this is, however, a strictly separate question from whether rules of 
private international law themselves permit judicial discretion. A state could adopt 
rules of private international law which limit judicial discretion in support of a variety 
of domestic policies, including national conceptions of justice and fairness, and 
perhaps most obviously the desire to give private parties a more certain and 
predictable legal order26. 
 
Where such rules are adopted, for whatever reason, the presence of an apparently 
discretionary public policy exception must not be confused with the adoption of a 
discretionary rule. The risk here, by no means unique to this context or even to private 
international law, is that the exception could swallow the rule. To use the words of 
one United States court: 
 
“Since every law is an expression of the public policy of the state, some higher 
threshold is needed to prevent the forum’s law from being applied in every case. 
A strict construction of the public policy exception [is] necessary to prevent the 
whole field of conflicts of law from collapsing in on itself”27. 
 
An excessive application of a public policy discretion could risk undermining the very 
existence of rules of private international law. If the rules requiring application of a 
foreign law or the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements were too 
                                                 
22 But note the suggestion that “a Judge should, of course, be very slow to refuse to give effect to the 
legislation of a foreign state in any sphere in which, according to the accepted principles of 
international law, the foreign state has jurisdiction”: Empresa Exportadora de Azucar v Industria 
Azucarera Nacional SA (The Playa Larga and The Marble Islands) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 171 at 190. 
The relationship between public and private international law is explored in more detail in a 
forthcoming book by the author, to be published by Cambridge University Press, entitled “The 
Confluence of Public and Private International Law”. 
23 See, eg, Cook, WW, “The logical and legal bases of the conflict of laws” (1924) 33 Yale Law 
Journal 457. 
24 Dynamit v Rio Tinto [1918] AC 260 at 302. 
25 A position close to this is adopted by Briggs, A, “Foreign Judgments and Human Rights” (2005) 121 
Law Quarterly Review 185, who argues in the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments that the act of recognition is an internal act with only domestic effects. 
26 Equally, even if international law imposed limits on private international law, it might (depending on 
the nature of those limits) be possible to have a purely discretionary system of rules of private 
international law, and, through wise judicial fiat, be perfectly compliant. 
27 Tucker v RA Hanson Co (1992) 956 F 2d 215 at 218. 
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frequently set aside, this would no doubt lead to the accusation that public policy, and 
not private international law, dictated the applicable law28.  
2.2 Constitutional issues 
It might, however, be argued that public policy is a mechanism to ensure ‘justice’ 
between the parties – a mechanism which must be essentially unrestrained if it is to 
allow a judge to achieve that objective29. Although of course judges are invited to 
apply the public policy of the state, not their own policies, this approach risks 
empowering judges who are not servants to higher legal principles, but autocrats of 
their courtrooms, applying a public policy which is a product of “the idiosyncratic 
inferences of a few judicial minds”30. 
 
It has long been pointed out that excesses of judicial discretion may be inconsistent 
with the English constitutional conception of the rule of law31. The constitutional 
dimension to this analysis is clearest where choice of law rules or rules governing the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are expressed in a statute. In this 
situation, the English parliament has set a policy of recognising or enforcing foreign 
laws or judgments. The courts must have limits on their application of public policy if 
these are not to undermine the rules which parliament has established. This is 
particularly the case given that parliament may itself override rules of private 
international law through statutory mandatory rules, and the judicial application of 
public policy only arises where it has not done so32. It must be acknowledged that the 
scope of the exception may vary between different rules and in different contexts – for 
example, public policy may mean different things as part of the rules on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements when operating as part of the 
common law or between Member States of the European Union as part of the Brussels 
Regulation33. While it may be difficult to determine exactly how broad public policy 
is intended to be, it must nevertheless be presumed in each context that parliament 
cannot have intended to establish an exception whose effect is to undermine entirely 
the application of the rule. These concerns equally apply where the rules are sourced 
from European regulations which have direct domestic effect. 
 
Even where choice of law or judgment recognition rules are purely common law, 
developed by English courts themselves, there is a constitutional imperative for giving 
effect to them. To apply a public policy discretion in an excessive way would be to 
undermine the binding authority of the earlier decisions which developed the rule in 
                                                 
28 Some critics of traditional approaches to private international law in the United States in the early 
twentieth century did suggest that ‘escape devices’ like public policy were more significant than 
ostensibly fixed rules: see, eg, Lorentzen, EG, “Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws” 
(1924) 33 Yale Law Journal 736 at p.746ff. 
29 There is some support for such a perspective in United States approaches. Its influence in English 
case law is critically discussed in Collins, L (ed), “Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws” 
(14th edn, 2006) at p.98; see also Nygh, PE, “Foreign Status, Public Policy and Discretion” (1964) 13 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 39 at p.48ff. 
30 Fender v St John-Mildmay (1938) AC 1 at 12 (discussing domestic public policy). 
31 See, eg, Dicey, AV, “Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution” (8th edn, 1915). Nygh 
argued that “The courts might just as well abandon any attempt to formulate and apply defined rules of 
law, if these can be overridden by an undefinable discretion”: Nygh, PE, “Foreign Status, Public Policy 
and Discretion” (1964) 13 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 39 at p.51. 
32 Nutting, CB, “Suggested Limitations on the Public Policy Doctrine” (1935) 19 Minnesota Law 
Review 196. 
33 See further section 3.3 below. 
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question. It would effectively permit the court to evade the doctrine of precedent, 
relying on an expansive view of the exceptions to the prior established rule to 
undermine the binding effect of the rule itself34. 
 
In essence, this approach notes that choice of law rules and rules governing the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments are themselves public policies. Rules of 
private international law which dictate the application of foreign law or the 
recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment give effect to policy decisions. 
Whatever public policy is being invoked through a discretionary exception must be 
weighed against the public policy inherent in the rule, and the constitutional authority 
behind the adoption of that policy by parliament or by the courts themselves35. Courts 
cannot be entirely free to give effect to discretionary public policy without 
undermining other public policies and values. 
 
 
3 What limits should apply to public policy in private 
international law? 
The starting point for developing principled limits for the application of public policy 
in private international law is an understanding of the exact function and effect of 
public policy in this context. Public policy may be seen as a type of exceptional 
choice of law rule – a recognition which suggests a number of constraints which 
should operate to limit its application. 
3.1 Public policy as a choice of law rule 
The ordinary application of a choice of law rule is to select a governing law for a 
private dispute. If a dispute is brought before an English court, and English law is 
designated by the applicable English choice of law rules, then (with the possible 
exception of the rules concerning contracts whose performance is or becomes 
unlawful according to the place of performance36) no issue of public policy arises37. 
                                                 
34 Public policy itself is frequently viewed as not subject to the doctrine of precedent, because of its 
need to dynamically reflect changes in social values. 
35 The idea that public policy ought to defer to the principles underlying private international law also 
supports the (somewhat controversial) proposition that public policy may not be available in defence of 
the enforcement of a foreign judgment if it could have been raised before the foreign court but was not: 
see, eg, Israel Discount Bank of New York v Hadjipateras [1983] 3 All ER 129. 
36 See, eg, Foster v Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470; Regazzoni v KC Sethia Ltd [1958] AC 301. These may 
be explained as a special application of English public policy in support of a foreign law – an English 
policy that parties should not be held bound by a contract whose performance is or becomes unlawful 
according to the place of performance. Alternatively, they may be explained as rules of substantive 
English law, whereby it is an implied term of a contract governed by English law that its performance 
must remain lawful according to the law of the place of performance. The case law does not clearly 
distinguish between these justifications, but the distinction is important – but if the latter is correct, the 
principle should only apply to a contract governed by English law; if the former is correct, it would 
apply to prevent enforcement of a contract governed by one foreign law whose performance was 
unlawful according to another foreign law, the law of its place of performance. Note similarly Re 
Emery’s Investment Trusts [1959] 1 All ER 577, where equity refused to come to the aid of a 
participant in a scheme to evade foreign tax laws. 
37 Note, in this context, the rejection by the UK of Art.7(1) of the Rome Convention (1980), which 
would permit English courts to apply foreign public policy; see Dickinson, A, “Third-Country 
Mandatory Rules in the Law Applicable to Contractural Obligations: So Long, Farewell, Auf 
Wiedersehen, Adieu?” (2007) 3 Journal of Private International Law 53; Chong, A, “The Public Policy 
and Mandatory Rules of Third Countries in International Contracts” (2006) 2 Journal of Private 
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English law must be assumed to be compatible with English public policy. If foreign 
law is chosen, the effect of public policy is to apply a local norm in priority over that 
foreign law38. The application of English public policy as a basis for refusing to apply 
a foreign law thus constitutes a rejection of the ordinary application of the choice of 
law rule, the selection of foreign law, in favour of English norms. The application of 
public policy is essentially an implicit and overriding choice of English law.  
 
The fact that the foreign law is disapplied on the grounds of an English policy is a 
distinct point from the debate as to what the appropriate consequences of an 
application of public policy should be. Having excluded the application of a particular 
rule of foreign law, it is unclear whether the lacuna should be filled with the residual 
applicable law or the law of the forum39 – a point which distinguishes the (negative) 
conception of public policy examined in this article from the (positive) conception of 
public policy expressed through mandatory rules. The answer to this problem must 
depend on whether such a residual applicable law, compatible with local public 
policy, can be identified and applied to the dispute. Where this is the case, it ought to 
be applied to give effect to the policies underlying choice of law rules40. Where it is 
not possible to apply the remainder of the applicable law, the law of the forum is 
generally considered the most appropriate alternative41, although this will be 
discussed further below42. In either case, whatever positive law is introduced in place 
of the offensive foreign law, the negative exclusionary effect of the application of 
English public policy remains an application of local norms.  
 
In the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, a similar 
analysis applies. If the foreign court has applied English substantive law, then no 
issue of public policy will ordinarily arise, except potentially in respect of foreign 
procedural law, again on the basis that English law must be assumed to be compatible 
with English public policy. A very serious failure to apply English law correctly 
might, at least theoretically, give rise to a claim that the foreign proceedings breached 
standards of natural justice, but even a decision based on an incorrect application of 
                                                                                                                                            
International Law 27. The recently adopted Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (6 June 2008, 2005/0261 (COD)) contains (in 
Art.9(3)) a much more heavily qualified provision, which is broadly consistent with the English 
approach to foreign illegality noted above. 
38 Aside from the cases on foreign illegality noted above, English courts have rejected arguments that 
public policy can be used to justify the application of foreign law: see, eg, Peer International v 
Thermidor Publishers [2003] EWCA Civ 1156; Bank voor Handel v Slatford [1951] 2 All ER 779. 
39 See, eg, Blom, J, “Public Policy in Private International Law and Its Evolution in Time” (2003) 50 
Netherlands International Law Review 373, pp.375-6; Lagarde, P, “Public Policy”, Chapter 11, in 
Lipstein, K (ed), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol III: Private International Law 
(1994) at [59ff]; Mosconi, F, “Exceptions to the Operation of Choice of Law Rules” (1989-V) 217 
Recueil des Cours 9 at p.109ff.  
40 Thus, the House of Lords used public policy only to “disregard a provision in the foreign law” in 
Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co & Anor [2002] UKHL 19 at [18], per Lord Nichols, 
going on to apply, eg, residual provisions of the Iraqi Civil Code (at [45]-[46].) 
41 The application of English law is sometimes said to follow from the (dubious) presumption that 
foreign law, if unproven, is the same as English law: see, eg, Briggs, A, “Public Policy in the Conflict 
of Laws: a Sword and a Shield?” (2002) 6 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 953 at p.971. This 
presumption may itself be the subject of criticism on grounds similar to those explored in this paper – 
that it provides for the unprincipled application of forum law (eg, without consideration of proximity – 
see section 3.2 below). See further Fentiman, R, “Foreign Law in English Courts” (1998); Shaker v Al-
Bedrawi [2002] EWCA Civ 1452. 
42 See section 3.2 below. 
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English law will not be contrary to English public policy43. Where, however, a foreign 
court applies a foreign law (including but not necessarily its own), whether as part of 
substantive or procedural rules, there is a possibility that the content of the law, or the 
outcome of its application, could be contrary to English norms. A refusal to recognise 
or enforce a foreign judgment on the grounds of its incompatibility with English 
public policy is a refusal to give effect to foreign law – an exception to the usual 
deference given by the English court to a prior foreign determination of a dispute or 
issue between the parties. It is, again, an implicit and overriding prioritisation of 
English norms.  
 
The application of public policy is not just an exceptional choice of law rule because 
it chooses local law in circumstances which are an exception to the usual choice of 
law process. It is exceptional also because it is a choice of law rule which is attentive 
to the substantive content of the applicable law. In the context of choice of law rules, 
it is the only basis on which an English court will examine the content of foreign law 
before making the determination of what law to apply44. This is true regardless of the 
position which is taken on the contentious issue of whether public policy is addressed 
purely to the foreign law, or to its application in the specific case at hand45. Both 
possibilities probably should be accepted – public policy is ordinarily attentive to the 
specific context of each case, but if a law is (exceptionally) “so grave an infringement 
of human rights that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law 
at all”46, then it is difficult to see that it should ever be applied47. In either case, it is 
necessary to examine the substantive content of the foreign law to make the 
determination. In the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, public policy is, again, the only ground on which an English court may 
examine the substance of the foreign decision.  
 
Viewing public policy in this way, as an exceptional choice of law rule, has two 
evident consequences. The first is that this exceptional character provides in itself a 
justification for limiting the application of public policy – it embodies an approach 
(examining the substance of foreign law) which is, in general, viewed as contrary to 
English principles of private international law. The second consequence is that, 
despite this exceptional character, recognising that public policy is a type of choice of 
law rule suggests that it should be subject to the restraints ordinarily applicable to 
choice of law rules – the limits of its operation should be governed by the same 
policies or principles which underpin and constrain choice of law rules themselves. 
 
This analysis is consistent with and draws on the constitutional arguments examined 
above for limits on public policy in private international law. The application of 
public policy should be balanced against the public policy of private international law 
                                                 
43 Godard v Gray (1870) LR 6 QB 139. 
44 The possibility of looking at the content of the competing laws is a distinguishing features of a 
number of approaches to choice of law in the United States, where this examination may be conducted 
as part of the analysis of competing government interests or directly in determining the ‘better law’: 
see, eg, Symeonides, SC, “American Conflicts Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century” (2000) 37 
Willamette Law Review 1; Leflar, RA, “Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law” (1966) 
41 New York University Law Review 267. 
45 See, eg, Lagarde, P, “Public Policy”, Chapter 11, in Lipstein, K (ed), International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, Vol III: Private International Law (1994) at [24ff]. 
46 Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249 at 278. 
47 See further discussion in section 6 below. 
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itself – the public policy embodied in choice of law rules and rules governing the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This concern is met by the 
recognition that public policy is effectively an exceptional choice of law rule, whose 
operation must be constrained by the ordering principles which operate behind other 
choice of law rules. The next stage in the analysis of public policy must then be to 
identify these principles. 
3.2 Proximity 
Choice of law rules embody a policy determination of which legal system is most 
‘interested’ in a dispute or has the greatest ‘proximity’ to the dispute, and should 
therefore have regulatory authority over it. The diversity of choice of law rules around 
the world reflects the variety of possible interpretations of what constitutes an 
‘interest’ and how different interests are to be balanced against each other.  
 
Some choice of law rules are open textured and allow the courts to make their own 
determination of proximity, taking into consideration a wide variety of factors. This is 
frequently the case, for example, in the context of the law applicable to a contract in 
the absence of choice by the parties48. In some United States approaches to choice of 
law, the courts are invited to conduct a comparative interest analysis, based on an 
examination of both the objective factors connecting the dispute or the disputants with 
a particular place, together with competing state policies and statutes49. Other choice 
of law rules determine the greatest interest directly through a fixed rule – for example, 
the lex situs rule in the context of choice of law in property50. In the context of choice 
of law in contract, the selection of a governing law by the parties is (under both 
common law51 and the Rome Convention52) given overriding effect as a determination 
of interest, respecting the party autonomy underlying contract law itself. In an effort 
to balance the advantages of each approach, and the demands of both predictability 
and flexibility, many choice of law rules combine fixed rules with open textured rules. 
This is the case, for example, in the choice of law rule for contracts under the Rome 
Convention (involving, in the absence of party choice, presumptions subject to a 
flexible exception53) and for torts under the Private International Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1995 and Rome II Regulation (2007) (each of which combines a lex 
loci delicti rule with a flexible exception)54.  
 
The key point is that, regardless of whether a fixed or open textured choice of law rule 
is adopted, there are a wide variety of interests under consideration in a dispute over 
the applicable law. This is not to endorse interest analysis as a choice of law rule, but 
to suggest that any choice of law rule itself implicitly constitutes a form of interest 
analysis. The mere fact that a fixed rule may determine that a foreign legal system has 
the greatest proximity to the dispute, or has the greatest interest in it, does not exclude 
                                                 
48 See, eg, Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] 1 AC 50. 
49 See, eg, Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws, American Law Institute (1969) s.6. This 
approach arguably subsumes elements of a public policy analysis within the choice of law rule, 
reducing the importance of public policy in the modern private international law of the United States. 
50 See, eg, Winkworth v Christie, Manson & Woods [1980] Ch 496. 
51 See, eg, Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277. 
52 Rome Convention (1980), Art.3. 
53 Rome Convention (1980), Art.4. 
54 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, ss.11-12; Regulation (EC) No 
864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations (“Rome II”), Art.4. 
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the possibility that the law of the forum may also have an interest. The fact that the 
balance of interests in an open textured rule may tip in favour of the application of a 
foreign law does not exclude the existence of other interests pointing towards the law 
of the forum. Behind the mechanics of specific choice of law rules, the underlying 
question is one of determining which legal system is most interested in the context of 
a variety of competing factors – it is a question of degree. This means that even if 
choice of law rules dictate that foreign law is to be applied to a dispute, there can still 
be a substantial domestic interest in the dispute. Despite a decision by an English 
court that foreign law is applicable, a number of factors may still connect the dispute 
to England. These factors may sometimes be identified in the choice of law rule itself, 
either as part of an open textured rule55 or as ‘subsidiary’ choice of law rules56; in 
other cases this may require the court to conduct its own evaluation of the connecting 
factors, perhaps more akin to a US style interest analysis approach. In each case, the 
strength of those factors can be examined to determine how interested English law is 
in the dispute, the degree of proximity of the dispute to the forum. 
 
Determining the proximity of the dispute is important, because the invocation of local 
public policy, itself an application of local law, needs to be justified based on the 
same criteria which would be used to justify the application of local law to the 
entirety of the dispute. There must be some sort of connection such that the 
application of the local policy is appropriate, because the forum state is sufficiently 
interested in the dispute that it should have (at least partial) regulatory authority over 
it57. Like any other application of local law, the use of public policy should depend on 
an examination of the connecting factors operating between the dispute and the forum 
state58. The weaker this interest is, the more that public policy should be restricted. 
The stronger this interest is, the greater the degree of proximity, the greater the 
justification for the application of public policy. 
 
It is of course not only the forum which may have an interest in a dispute otherwise 
governed by foreign law. This incidentally seems to suggest the most principled 
answer to the problem identified above as to what law to fall back on after an 
application of public policy59. If possible, the court should apply the remainder of the 
                                                 
55 In choice of law in tort, eg, the factors identified in section 12 of the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. 
56 For example, if the parties have chosen a law to govern their contract, the rules which would 
determine the applicable law in the absence of such a choice – Article 4 of the Rome Convention – 
might aid determination of the proximity of the dispute with England. 
57 Thus, “the strength of a public policy argument must in each case be directly proportional to the 
intensity of the link which connects the facts of the case with this country” – Kahn-Freund, O, 
“Reflections on Public Policy in the English Conflict of Laws” (1954) 39 Transactions of the Grotius 
Society 39 at p.58; see also Kahn-Freund, O, “General Problems of Private International Law” 
(1974-III) 143 Recueil des Cours 139 at pp.428-9. 
58 In Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v 
Sweden) [1958] ICJ Reports 55, Judge Lauterpacht expressed the view that international law defines 
limits on the permissible applicability of public policy, perhaps the need for a “close territorial 
connection” (at pp.97-8). Judge Quintana expressed the view (at p.108) that “before the ordre public of 
a country may be validly invoked against an international convention there must exist a substantive 
connection between the person concerned and the territory”. While an international convention could 
clearly imply additional limits on the exercise of public policy (perhaps increasing the necessary 
degree of connection), there is no reason why a substantive connection would not also be required 
outside of this context. 
59 See section 3.1 above; Lagarde, P, “Public Policy”, Chapter 11, in Lipstein, K (ed), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol III: Private International Law (1994) at [63]. 
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applicable law, without the part which is offensive to public policy. If this is not 
possible, the usual approach is to turn to English substantive law. But a better 
approach would be to consider which state has the next greatest interest in governing 
the dispute. This may be the forum, which will undoubtedly have some interest giving 
rise to its jurisdiction over the dispute and the application of its public policy60. It may 
equally, however, be another foreign state, whose law should therefore fill the lacuna 
created by the exclusionary application of public policy. This would not constitute an 
application of foreign public policy or foreign mandatory rules61, but an application of 
foreign substantive law as the result of a ‘subsidiary’ choice of law rule. Similarly to 
the analysis above, in some cases such a rule may be derived from the choice of law 
rule62; in other cases it may require a more ad hoc determination of the interests of 
affected states. 
 
3.3 Relativity 
An English court will ordinarily apply foreign law or recognise and enforce a foreign 
judgment even if the result is different from that which would be reached under 
English law, and probably even if the cause of action is unknown to English law63. A 
refusal to do so on the grounds of public policy is effectively a statement that the 
differing outcome of the dispute, or the way in which foreign law is different from 
local law, is unacceptable in this particular, exceptional case. The application of 
public policy is therefore really a question of the limits of tolerance. This insight 
invites the realisation that the question of the application of public policy should also 
depend on the character of the policy itself which might be applied.  
 
To understand this further it is necessary to recognise that norms possess a range of 
degrees of ‘relativity’. Sometimes a distinction is drawn between three types of public 
policy: internal public policy, or ordre public interne (applying purely to domestic 
cases, for example, to invalidate a contract governed by English law), international 
public policy, or ordre public international (applying in the context of private 
international law) and ‘truly international’ public policy, or ordre public 
veritablement international (public policy which is derived from international law – 
discussed further below)64. These categories do not, however, indicate clearly distinct 
types of norms, but merely positions on a continuum. At one end of the spectrum are 
purely domestic considerations which are matters of local policy and which, it is 
accepted, could easily be different, for example, the doctrine of consideration in 
contract law. At the other end are the most elemental values, for example, 
fundamental human rights norms, which are (and, according to the states who do 
adopt them, must be) shared by all states as basic elements of public policy. Most 
norms will be somewhere in between – policies which a state is committed to, which 
                                                 
60 Although, as will be seen in sections 3.3 and 4.3 below, in some cases the application of public 
policy may be justifiable without any degree of proximity. 
61 See further section 3.1 above. 
62 For example, if the law selected by the parties to govern a contract was contrary to public policy, the 
court could apply the law determined by the choice of law rule which would apply in the absence of 
such a choice – Article 4 of the Rome Convention. 
63 See, eg, Cablevision Systems Development Co v Shoupe (1986) 39 WIR 1; Anderson, W, 
“Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Founded Upon a Cause of Action Unknown in the Forum” (1993) 
42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 697.  
64 See, eg, Burger, DC, “Transnational Public Policy as a Factor in Choice of Law Analysis” (1984) 5 
New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 370 at p.374ff. 
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are not shared universally, but where the state’s commitment entails some degree of 
lack of tolerance for breach of the norms. Public policy is not invoked just because 
foreign law is different from local law, but because local law is intolerant of the way 
in which it is different. The more absolute the conception of a norm is, the less room 
there is for tolerance of difference, and the more likely it is that public policy will be 
invoked to give effect to the norm.  
 
The characterisation of a norm as ‘absolute’ is, in fact, just one way in which the 
relativity of a norm can be reduced. This occurs in any context in which there is a 
belief that the policy is both applicable locally and is (or ought to be) applicable in the 
foreign legal system whose law governs the dispute. There are four distinct ways in 
which public policy can have diminished relativity in this sense.  
 
First, public policy can be shared in a bilateral sense. If two states happen to share the 
same public policy, then there is a strong argument that the courts of each state should 
be prepared to apply this public policy where the law of the other state is in breach of 
it. This may be the result of a coincidence of policy, or of a derivative recognition of 
the policy of one state by another. For example, as noted above65, under English law, 
there is a policy against the enforcement of contracts which are or become unlawful 
according to the law of the place of performance of the contract. One interpretation of 
this rule is that English courts are in effect adopting the public policy (expressed 
through its domestic law) of a foreign state. Where public policy is shared with or 
derived from the foreign law under consideration, there is a stronger argument that the 
courts should be prepared to apply this form of public policy regardless of the 
proximity of the dispute with the forum. 
 
Second, public policy can be shared in a regional sense. For example, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) provides a source of regional norms which 
are viewed as fundamental and shared between the states who are parties to the 
Convention. If a dispute involves a number of states who are parties to the ECHR, 
then the policies it embodies possess an essentially communal character. To the extent 
that public policy is European in its origin and conception, it is no longer a source of 
national variation in the application of the rules of private international law, a residual 
(defensive) expression of national values. Instead, the application of European public 
policy gives (positive) effect to shared values, ensuring that the application of private 
international law rules does not breach fundamental rights66. 
 
                                                 
65 See section 3.1 above. 
66 Muir Watt, H, “Evidence of an Emergent European Legal Culture: Public Policy Requirements of 
Procedural Fairness Under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions” (2001) 36 Texas International Law 
Journal 539. Recital 32 of the Rome II Regulation (2007) contemplates the use of public policy to 
refuse to apply foreign laws providing for “exemplary or punitive damages of an excessive nature”, but 
arguably leaves ultimate determination of this issue to each Member State. A more extensive 
“clarification of the meaning of public policy at Community level” had been proposed by the European 
Parliament, which would have included a prohibition on such damages as part of the definition of 
public policy, in addition to “fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, national constitutional provisions [and] international humanitarian law” 
– European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”) (A6-
0211/2005, COM(2003)0427 – C5-0338/2003 – 2003/0168(COD)), Amendment 50. 
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Third, public policy can be absolute, meaning that it is (at least prescriptively) shared 
in a universal sense. This is clearest where it derives from agreed international norms, 
such as those expressed in customary international law or widely adopted 
international treaties67. The most obvious examples of norms which might be 
recognised in this way are norms of international human rights. This form of public 
policy is sometimes referred to as ‘transnational’ public policy, or ‘truly international 
public policy’68. The application of this form of public policy has had only limited 
articulation and exploration by common law judges and theorists – it has been 
cautiously observed that “local values ought not lightly to be elevated into public 
policy on the transnational level”69. In national law, the special character of this form 
of public policy is recognised in France and Germany, where a distinction is drawn 
between public policy derived from domestic norms and public policy which is 
derived from obligations under international law70.  
 
One of the clearest expressions of this idea is found in the context of international 
arbitration, where its development reflects the need for arbitrators to find a way to 
recognise public interests (for example, against corruption) in a way which does not 
compromise the private (non-state) character of the system of arbitration. 
International arbitrators have conceptualised a body of both substantive and 
procedural international public policy, drawing on principles which are (or are 
perceived to be, or it is thought ought to be) universally adopted in national legal 
systems71. The application of these principles thus accommodates public interests and 
                                                 
67 Mann notes the argument that “all rules of public international law are of necessity so fundamental 
and essential an element of the legal order that they are part of public order”, but prefers the direct 
application of public international law by domestic courts in this context “without the interposition of 
public policy”, in order “to exclude the discretionary flavour which is inherent in ordre public” : Mann, 
FA, “Conflict of Laws and Public Law” (1971-I) 132 Recueil des Cours 107 at p.155. See also Vest, 
LL, “Cross-Border Judgments and the Public Policy Exception: Solving the Foreign Judgment 
Quandary by Way of Tribal Courts” (2004) 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 797 (arguing 
for the adoption of an international “constitution-like” document to establish international standards of 
public policy, by analogy with the relationship between the United States federal government and tribal 
nations). 
68 See generally Wahab, MSA, “Cultural Globalization and Public Policy: Exclusion of Foreign Law in 
the Global Village” in Freeman, M (ed), Law and Sociology (2005) 8 Current Legal Issues 
360; Mosconi, F, “Exceptions to the Operation of Choice of Law Rules” (1989-V) 217 Recueil des 
Cours 9 at p.67ff; Burger, DC, “Transnational Public Policy as a Factor in Choice of Law Analysis” 
(1984) 5 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 370; Dolinger, J, 
“World Public Policy – Real International Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws” (1982) 17 Texas 
International Law Journal 167. 
69 Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co & Anor [2002] UKHL 19 at [114], per Lord Steyn. 
70 See Lagarde, P, “Public Policy”, Chapter 11, in Lipstein, K (ed), International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, Vol III: Private International Law (1994) at [55ff]; Benvenisti, E, “Judicial 
Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National 
Courts” (1993) 4 European Journal of International Law 159 at pp.171-2; German section, p.12ff, in 
Rubino-Sammartano, M and Morse, CGJ (eds), “Public Policy in Transnational Relationships” (loose 
leaf, 1991ff). 
71 See, eg, World Duty Free Company Ltd v Kenya, ICSID ARB/00/7 (Award, 4 October 2006) at [138-
157], and references therein (focusing on the international public policy against bribery and 
corruption); McDougall, A, “International Arbitration and Money Laundering” (2005) 20 American 
University International Law Review 1021 at p.1042ff; Gaillard, E and Savage, J, “Fouchard, Gaillard 
and Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration” (1999) at p.860ff, p.953ff; Craig, Park and 
Paulsson, “International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration” (3rd edn, 2000) at p 338ff; Lagarde, P, 
“Public Policy”, Chapter 11, in Lipstein, K (ed), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol 
III: Private International Law (1994) at [57]; Lalive, P, “Transnational (or Truly International) Public 
 14 
values but does not involve the submission of the arbitration to any particular national 
order72.  
 
Fourth and finally, public policy can also exceptionally possess an absolute character 
where it is derived not from international norms, but from an essential national 
interest. Such cases must necessarily be rare, but explain the use of public policy to 
prevent enforcement of a contract which may aid an enemy state during a time of 
war73.  
 
In practice a norm will rarely belong indisputably to any of these four categories – its 
relativity will almost always be a question of degree. Public policy may be basically 
shared between two states, but with some level of continued disagreement about its 
exact scope of application. Another factor which must be considered in evaluating the 
relativity of a norm is the degree of tolerance of difference in the interpretation and 
application of the policy – what human rights scholars call the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ of the norm. Norms which are more open to differing interpretations, 
which leave a greater degree of discretion to states to determine the manner and scope 
of their implementation, are necessarily less capable of being absolute than norms 
which establish a clear and fixed prohibition. In the former case, there is a greater 
scope for states to adopt positions which are different but equally consistent with 
underlying public policy.  
 
All these points lead towards a single conclusion. The extent to which a public policy 
is shared or absolute (ought to be shared) determines the degree of relativity of the 
public policy concerned. The less the public policy is shared, or the greater the 
relativity of the public policy, the harder it is to justify its application as an 
‘intolerant’ exception to the normal rules on the application of foreign law or the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
 
The possibility of shared or absolute public policy does not merely affect the 
justifiability of an application of public policy. Where public policy possesses this 
character, it transforms the effect of the public policy exception itself. Where the 
public policy is (actually or putatively) accepted in all the affected states, it cannot be 
argued that it is being used as a mechanism to impose domestic policies. A finding 
that the foreign law is contrary to public policy involves, in effect, a finding that the 
foreign law is contrary to the public policy of the foreign state itself, and thus the 
public policy should be applied in preference to the foreign law. It therefore does not 
undermine the systemic objectives of private international law. There is no question 
of intolerance of difference, given that there is at least a belief in an essential unity of 
policy. Public policy becomes instead a mechanism through which other norms are 
made to prevail over the policies inherent in private international law. It operates as a 
                                                                                                                                            
Policy and International Arbitration”, in Sanders, P (ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public 
Policy in Arbitration (1986) at p.257ff (and other articles at p.177ff).  
72 Arbitrators may, of course, also take into consideration the public policy of the state or states where 
an award is likely to be enforced, in order to ensure that it is effective. 
73 Dynamit v Rio Tinto [1918] AC 260; Robson v Premier Oil and Pipe Line Co [1915] 2 Ch 124. In 
Lorentzen v Lydden & Co [1942] 2 KB 202 the public policy of supporting wartime allies was used to 
justify the application of foreign law contrary to the usual choice of law rule, but this ‘positive’ role for 
public policy was disapproved of in Bank voor Handel v Slatford [1951] 2 All ER 779. 
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form of flexibility in the application of choice of law or judgment recognition and 
enforcement rules, without undermining the universality of the rule system. 
 
The application of shared or absolute public policy is thus not a ‘horizontal’ assertion 
of the policies of one state over another; it is a ‘vertical’ assertion of one policy over 
another, within a legal order. It involves a claim concerning the hierarchy of norms, 
not a claim concerning the relative superiority of the content of the norms. It is not a 
negative argument for rejection of the application of foreign law, but a positive 
argument for flexibility in choice of law rules to allow them to reflect other shared or 
international policies74. Accepting public policy in this context is thus consistent with 
the conceptualisation of public policy from a constitutional perspective, discussed 
above. If public policy is adopted in a context in which it is shared or absolute, it does 
not involve an exercise of judicial discretion contrary to the policies of the state, but 
an indirect method of giving effect to those policies; it is not an imposition of the 
norms of one state on another, but a method of prioritising one norm (which may 
itself be international) over another75. 
 
Thus, the scope of application of a public policy should depend not merely on the 
degree of local connection with the dispute, but on the degree of relativity of the norm 
of public policy which is being considered. Where the public policy is strongly 
relative, a high degree of proximity between the dispute and the forum state will be 
necessary to justify its application. Where the public policy is shared or absolute, 
there is no need to limit its application, because it does not involve an implicit choice 
or prioritisation of local norms, and thus is qualitatively distinct from the intolerance 
involved in an application of merely local policy76. 
 
This understanding of public policy reveals, however, another reason why public 
policy may be limited even in the context of a shared or absolute norm. Where public 
policy applies in this way, the application of the policy becomes a question of 
enforcement of shared norms, a method of ensuring the compliance of the foreign 
legal order with norms applicable to it. But it is not clear that it will always be 
acceptable for the courts of one state to evaluate the compliance of a foreign law or 
the judgment of a foreign court with a shared policy, particularly if other mechanisms 
of ensuring compliance exist. 
 
For example, it has been argued that a judgment from a state which is a party to the 
ECHR, obtained in breach of rights established under the ECHR and being enforced 
in another Convention state, should be refused recognition on the grounds of public 
policy regardless of the proximity of the dispute with the forum, because the values 
                                                 
74 Dolinger, J, “World Public Policy – Real International Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws” (1982) 
17 Texas International Law Journal 167 at p.177. 
75 It therefore does not depend on a ‘monist’ conception of international law as directly applicable in 
English law or as having priority over domestic rules or policies: see, eg, Mosconi, F, “Exceptions to 
the Operation of Choice of Law Rules” (1989-V) 217 Recueil des Cours 9 at p.68ff; Mann, FA, “The 
Consequences of an International Wrong in International and National Law” (1976-7) 48 British 
Yearbook of International Law 1. 
76 See generally Mann, FA, “The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and 
National Law” (1976-7) 48 British Yearbook of International Law 1 at p.28ff (arguing against the use 
of public policy to give effect to international law, out of concern that it may be inappropriately 
restricted). 
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which are applied here are shared, and equally applicable in both states77. However, it 
might equally be suggested that the application of public policy should be restricted to 
reflect the requirements of mutual respect and trust between Member States, and the 
priority of the European Court of Human Rights as a mechanism for enforcing ECHR 
standards78. Thus, it may be argued that the courts of Convention states should, at 
least in some circumstances, refrain from reviewing decisions of other states for 
compliance with ECHR rights, unless the breach is so serious that the need to remedy 
the breach outweighs the need to respect the usual procedures. This provides the best 
explanation for the hesitancy expressed by the courts in permitting public policy to be 
used in this way – here, the limits on public policy do not derive from the proximity 
of the dispute or the degree of relativity of the applicable norms, but from the context 
of mutual trust and institutional deference. 
 
In summary, a further dimension of the application of public policy is the degree of 
relativity of the norm. The greater the relativity of the norm, the more its application 
involves an intolerance of difference in foreign law, and the less easily courts should 
be prepared to apply it. Norms which are absolute or shared between states should 
ordinarily be more freely applied by courts, but even these may be limited by 
considerations of mutual trust and deference to alternative mechanisms for the 
enforcement of the norms. 
3.4 Seriousness of the breach 
Another related consideration for the invocation of public policy is the seriousness of 
the breach of the norm. A norm may be violated in a minor, technical way, or through 
a fundamental breach. For some norms, there will be more obvious degrees of 
violation. For example, the fact that a foreign court has awarded greater damages than 
would be awarded by an English court would not of itself be grounds for refusing 
recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment. However, if a hugely excessive 
amount of damages were awarded in foreign proceedings, English courts would be 
likely to refuse recognition on the grounds of public policy. The question of how 
excessive the award needs to be before it becomes contrary to public policy is 
obviously a question of degree. Similarly, although English law dictates a minimum 
age of 16 for getting married, a foreign marriage of two 15 year olds is much less 
likely to justify the application of public policy than an arranged marriage of two 
much younger children. Thus, the seriousness of breach of a norm is itself in many 
cases a further dimension of analysis for the application of public policy in private 
international law. The more serious the breach, the more likely and the more 
acceptable it becomes that public policy may be invoked against the breach. 
 
 
                                                 
77 Maronier v Larmer [2003] QB 620 (suggesting that this may only be available in cases of breach of 
ECHR procedural standards, not in case of suggested non-compliance with substantive law); see also 
Citibank NA v Rafidian Bank & Anor [2003] EWHC 1950. 
78 See Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-0000, Case C-7/98 (discussed in section 4.2 below); Régie 
Nationale des Usines Renault v Maxicar [2000] ECR I-2973, Case C-38/98. 
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4 Mapping the principled application of public policy in private 
international law 
4.1 Diagrammatical representation 
Three elements of public policy have been identified – the degree of proximity 
between the dispute and the forum, the degree of relativity of the policy norm, and the 
seriousness of the breach of that norm. Public policy should be more likely to be 
invoked if there is a strong connection with the forum, the norm is shared or absolute, 
and the breach is serious. Public policy should be less likely to be invoked if the 
forum has little interest in the dispute, the norm is more relative, and the breach is 
minor. These elements can be interpreted as three dimensions of public policy, and 
thus represented as a ‘map’ which indicates the circumstances in which public policy 
is or ought to be applicable (Figure 1). Thus, public policy becomes applicable the 
greater the proximity of the dispute with the forum state, the greater the extent to 
which the affected norm possesses a shared or absolute character (the lower its 
relativity), and the greater the seriousness of the breach. 
 
 
The next stage in this examination of public policy is to test the practice of the 
English courts against this analytical framework. It may readily be observed that 
courts in general, and particularly common law courts, do not always appear to 
analyse these issues clearly, and an element of interpretation is thus necessary. 
Nevertheless, it will be argued that the practice of the English courts has been broadly 
consistent with the principles developed above.  
 
For the sake of simplicity and ease of illustration, in the following analysis only two 
of these factors will be examined – first, the proximity of the dispute, and second, the 
relativity of the norms. This can be represented as a ‘cross-section’ of Figure 1, in two 
dimensions (Figure 2). In the analysis to follow, five different categories of cases will 
be distinguished, indicated on the diagram with the appropriate letter. 
 
 
Breach of shared or  
absolute norm 
(Relativity) 
Strong forum interest 
(Proximity) 
Seriousness of breach 
The shaded area (a triangular 
pyramid) indicates when public 
policy does not apply – it 
represents the boundaries of 
tolerance. 
 
Figure 1 
 18 
 
 
Of course this analysis is not intended to suggest that real life cases, including the 
cases considered below, fit neatly into these categories. Any case may, however, be 
located somewhere on this diagram, and this placing will suggest whether public 
policy should or should not be invoked. The determination of where a case fits into 
the diagram itself involves elements of judgment, of evaluation of the facts. 
Nevertheless, analysing public policy through these policy dimensions does, it is 
argued, represent a significant advance on its traditional characterisation as 
discretionary. 
4.2 Category A – Proximate disputes and shared or absolute policies 
The first category of cases to be examined is perhaps the easiest. These are cases in 
which the dispute is proximate to the forum (the forum has a strong interest in the 
dispute) and the policies which are at stake are shared with the other affected states or 
are absolute (and thus ought to be shared). The case law is consistent with the 
expectation that public policy should be readily applied in these circumstances. 
 
One of the oldest recorded English cases of the application of public policy falls 
clearly into this category. In Somerset’s case (1772)79, a slave purchased in Virginia 
by a Virginia resident was brought to England, escaped and was recaptured. An 
application was made to the English court for his release. Lord Mansfield noted that 
property rights in a slave were recognised under the law of Virginia, observing that 
“the power of a master over his slave has been exceedingly different, in different 
countries”. However, particularly given the presence of the slave in England80, he was 
prepared to apply the English public policy against slavery to refuse application of 
                                                 
79 Somerset v Stewart (1772) 20 State Trials 1 
80 Note the much later decision enforcing a contract for the sale of slaves in Brazil in Santos v Illidge 
(1860) 8 CBNS 861, suggesting that the policy against slavery remained somewhat relative. 
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that law, holding that “the state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of 
being introduced on any reasons, moral or political”. 
 
The case of Oppenheimer v Cattermole (1976)81 is perhaps the prototypical case for 
the application of public policy. This dispute involved a claim by Oppenheimer, a 
Jewish émigré from Nazi Germany who had acquired English nationality, in respect 
of his liability for UK income tax. The dispute was therefore highly proximate to 
England. It turned on the question of whether he had also retained his German 
nationality, which had been purportedly stripped from him by a 1941 German law on 
the grounds of his race – an act clearly contrary to both English and international 
policies against racial discrimination. The court held that “it is part of the public 
policy of this country that our courts should give effect to clearly established rules of 
international law”82, emphasising their preparedness to give effect to public policy 
which possesses this absolute character, and thus refused to recognise the effect of the 
discriminatory German law83. This decision is consistent with other cases in which the 
courts have refused to apply a foreign law where it is viewed as contrary to 
international law84. 
 
A more recent decision which illustrates the role of public policy in this type of 
situation is the European Court of Justice case of Krombach v Bamberski (2001)85. 
Krombach, domiciled in Germany, was both criminally prosecuted and subject to civil 
proceedings in France following the death of a French girl in Germany. Under French 
procedural rules, his failure to appear in the criminal proceedings prevented him from 
presenting a defence in the civil proceedings. The issue was whether the French civil 
judgment should be enforceable in Germany under the Brussels Convention (1968)86. 
From the perspective of the German court, this was clearly a proximate dispute, 
involving a claim against a German domicile in respect of conduct in Germany. 
Further, it was held that the French court’s procedural rule which denied the 
defendant the opportunity to present a defence was a “manifest breach of a 
fundamental right” under the European Convention on Human Rights87 – a policy 
                                                 
81 Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249. 
82 At p.278. 
83 Although the conclusion of the court was ultimately that the claimant had lost his German nationality 
for other reasons. 
84 See, eg, Anglo-Iranian Oil v Jaffrate (“The Rose Mary”) [1953] 1 WLR 246 (Supreme Court of 
Aden, refusing to recognise proprietary effects of an Iranian law purporting to nationalise foreign 
owned oil in Iran, on the grounds that nationalisation of foreign owned property without compensation 
is contrary to international law). The judgment in the English case of In re Claim by Helbert Wagg & 
Co Ltd [1956] Ch 323 doubted some of the reasoning in the former case, but accepted that public 
policy, which may require reference to international law, provided a limit on the ordinary application of 
foreign law as the lex situs in proprietary questions.  See further Novello and Co v Hinrichsen Edition 
[1951] 1 All ER 779 (refusing to recognise a German law forcing an undervalued sale of Jewish 
property); Frankfurther v W L Exner Ltd [1947] Ch 629; Re Fried Krupp Actien-Gesellschaft [1917] 2 
Ch 188 (refusing to apply a German law held (at p.194) to be “not conformable to the usage of 
nations”); Wolff v Oxholm [1814-23] All ER Rep 208. In De Wutz v Hendricks (1824) 2 Bing 314 a 
contract governed by English law was similarly held invalid on the grounds that it was contrary to the 
‘law of nations’. 
85 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-0000, Case C-7/98. 
86 Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, OJ C 27, 26.1.1998. 
87 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-0000, Case C-7/98 at [40]. 
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clearly shared between France and Germany88. The European Court of Justice, while 
confirming previous authority to the effect that the public policy exception to the 
Brussels Convention must only be applied in exceptional cases89, reflecting at least in 
part the need for institutional deference discussed above90, held that it was open to the 
German court to apply public policy in these circumstances to prevent the 
enforcement of the French civil judgment in Germany91. On the analysis in this 
article, the fact that the public policy was both shared between the affected states and 
proximate to the forum state strongly justifies this conclusion92.  
4.3 Category B – Low proximity disputes but shared or absolute policies 
In the second category of cases, the dispute is not closely connected to the forum 
state, but the policies which are at stake are (or, it is believed ought to be) shared 
between the affected states. The case law is consistent with the conclusion that a 
strongly shared or absolute policy may be applied, regardless of the low proximity of 
the dispute. 
 
The application of this principle is clearly illustrated by the recent case of Kuwait 
Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways (2002)93. This dispute involved various claims 
concerning the ownership of aircraft which had been seized by Iraqi authorities from 
the claimants in the territory of Kuwait, at the time of the Iraqi invasion in 1990. Once 
seized, the aircraft had been taken to various locations in Iraq. The central issue was 
whether the English courts should recognise and give effect to a subsequent Iraqi law 
which purported to nationalise the aircraft. Ordinarily, an English court would 
recognise the proprietary effects of a nationalisation of property present on the 
territory of the nationalising state – the court will apply the lex situs of the property to 
determine ownership of the property. However, the court noted that “a provision of 
foreign law will be disregarded when it would lead to a result wholly alien to 
fundamental requirements of justice as administered by an English court”94. The court 
noted that the “seizure and assimilation were flagrant violations of rules of 
international law of fundamental importance”95, and thus held that “enforcement or 
                                                 
88 The European Court of Justice has also held that certain principles of European competition law 
constitute national public policy for the purposes of justifying the non-enforcement of an arbitral 
award: Eco Swiss China Time v Benetton International [1999] ECR I-3055. But see Régie Nationale 
des Usines Renault v Maxicar [2000] ECR I-2973, Case C-38/98, finding (at [32]) that “the fact that 
the alleged error concerns rules of Community law does not alter the conditions for being able to rely 
on the clause on public policy. It is for the national court to ensure with equal diligence the protection 
of rights established in national law and rights conferred by Community law”. On European public 
policy see generally Meidanis, HP, “Public Policy and Ordre Public in the Private International Law of 
the EU: Traditional Positions and Modern Trends” (2005) 30 European Law Review 95; Muir Watt, H, 
“Evidence of an Emergent European Legal Culture: Public Policy Requirements of Procedural Fairness 
Under the Brussels and Lugano Conventions” (2001) 36 Texas International Law Journal 539. 
89 See, eg, Hendrikman and Feyen v Magenta Druck & Verlag [1996] ECR I-4943; Solo Kleinmotoren 
v Boch [1994] ECR I-2237; Hoffmann v Krieg [1988] ECR 645, Case R-145/86. 
90 See section 3.3 above. 
91 The case went back to the German courts, which confirmed the application of public policy, and 
there were also proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights: for further detail see, eg, 
Lowenfeld, AF, “Jurisdiction, Enforcement, Public Policy and Res Judicata: The Krombach Case”, in 
Einhorn, T and Siehr, K (eds), Intercontinental Cooperation Through Private International Law: 
Essays in Memory of Peter E. Nygh (2004). 
92 See also Maronier v Larmer [2003] QB 620. 
93 Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co & Anor [2002] UKHL 19.  
94 At [16], per Lord Nichols. 
95 At [20], per Lord Nichols. 
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recognition of this law would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of English 
law”96. The court thus concluded that “a legislative act by a foreign state which is in 
flagrant breach of clearly established rules of international law ought not to be 
recognised by the courts of this country as forming part of the lex situs of that state”97 
– one judge describing the case as “a paradigm of the public policy exception”98.  
 
What of the fact that the case concerned events and property located entirely outside 
England? Lord Hope noted that: 
 
“There is nothing in this case which connects the laws of this country with the 
events constituting the alleged tort, other than the fact that this is the country 
where the proceedings were brought. As my noble and learned friend Lord Scott 
of Foscote has observed, this is an action in tort that has nothing whatever to do 
with England. So I would have no difficulty in holding that, in a case of this 
kind, a principle of English public policy which was purely domestic or 
parochial in character would not provide clear and satisfying grounds for 
disapplying the primary rule which favours the lex loci delicti.”99 
 
This clearly acknowledges the potential role of the principle of proximity in limiting 
the application of public policy. But Lord Hope also held that an absolute form of 
public policy could be applied regardless of proximity when he went on to conclude 
that: 
 
“the public policy objection which is raised in this case is plainly not of that 
character. It is based on the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions 
which were made under it. … There is a clear point of contact between this part 
of the lex loci delicti and the breaches of international law to which our courts 
are entitled to decline to give effect on grounds of public policy.”100 
 
In a dispute with very low proximity to England, the court was nevertheless prepared 
to invoke an absolute public policy, derived here from international law, to refuse to 
apply or give effect to a foreign law that would ordinarily be applicable under English 
choice of law rules. Other cases have similarly suggested that public policy may be 
readily applicable where the foreign law is “morally repugnant”101, “offensive to the 
conscience of the English court”102, or “violates some moral principle, which, if it is 
not, ought to be universally recognised”103. It has long been accepted that “where a 
                                                 
96 At [29], per Lord Nichols. 
97 At [148], per Lord Hope. 
98 At [114], per Lord Steyn. 
99 At [166], per Lord Hope. 
100 At [167], per Lord Hope. 
101 Glencore International v Metro Trading International [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 284 at 295 (refusing to 
apply public policy to invalidate a transfer of property which was valid under the lex situs). 
102 Cheni v Cheni [1965] P 85 at 99 (refusing to apply public policy to invalidate a marriage between an 
uncle and niece which was lawful under Egyptian law but would have been unlawful under English 
law); see similarly Armitage v Nanchen (1983) 4 FLR 293 (refusing to apply public policy to invalidate 
a foreign paternity determination on the grounds that the foreign procedures, while not compliant with 
English standards, did not “constitute an infraction of the rules of natural justice in the eye of the 
English court” (at p.300)). 
103 Kaufman v Gerson [1904] 1 KB 591 (applying public policy to refuse to recognise a contract 
entered into under duress in France, regardless of whether it was enforceable under French law); see 
similarly In re Meyer [1971] P 298 (applying public policy to refuse to recognise a divorce entered into 
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contract is void on the ground of immorality, or is contrary to such positive law as 
would prohibit the making of such a contract at all, then the contract would be void all 
over the world, and no civilised country would be called on to enforce it”104. 
 
These principles are further illustrated, albeit in a slightly different context, in the case 
of Lemenda Trading Co Ltd v African Middle East Petroleum Co Ltd (1988)105. The 
plaintiffs in this case sought to claim a commission under a contract in which they 
undertook to assist the respondents in procuring a deal for the supply of oil from 
Qatar (by influencing government officials). The court concluded that, if the dispute 
were litigated in Qatar, the contract would be void as contrary to the public policy of 
Qatar. The court also concluded that if the contract were to be performed in England, 
it would have been contrary to English public policy. But was it contrary to English 
public policy to enforce a contract to be performed in Qatar? The court noted that: 
 
“Some heads of public policy are based on universal principles of morality. … 
Where a contract infringes such a rule of public policy the English court will not 
enforce it, whatever the proper law of the contract and wherever the place of 
performance. Other principles of public policy may be based on considerations 
which are purely domestic. In such a case there would seem no good reason why 
they should be a bar to the enforcement of a contract to be performed abroad.”106 
 
Thus, the court acknowledged the effect of the relativity of the norm on the 
application of public policy in private international law. Here, the court concluded 
that “it is questionable whether the moral principles involved are so weighty as to lead 
an English court to refuse to enforce an agreement regardless of the country of 
performance and regardless of the attitude of that country to such a practice”107. Thus, 
it rejected the characterisation of the norm as possessing an absolute character. 
However, the court noted that:  
 
“In the present case Qatar, the country in which the agreement was to be 
performed and with which, in my view, the agreement had the closest 
connection, has the same public policy as that which prevails in England. … In 
my judgment, the English courts should not enforce an English law contract 
which falls to be performed abroad where (i) it relates to an adventure which is 
contrary to a head of English public policy which is founded on general 
principles of morality and (ii) the same public policy applies in the country of 
performance so that the agreement would not be enforceable under the law of 
                                                                                                                                            
under duress in Nazi Germany). The decision of Israel Discount Bank of New York v Hadjipateras 
[1983] 3 All ER 129 casts some doubt on whether duress really possesses the character of an absolute 
norm – in this case the English courts refused to apply public policy to prevent enforcement of a New 
York judgment based on a guarantee purportedly obtained under duress, because the defence had not 
and might have been raised before the New York court. But Royal Boskalis Westminster v Mountain 
[1999] QB 674 suggests that it is a question of degree, with the most serious forms of duress having the 
character of “moral principles which ought to be universally recognised” (p.725), which would thus not 
only form part of English public policy, but would be presumed to be part of French public policy. 
104 In re Missouri Steamship Co (1888) 42 Ch D 321 at 336 (a case in which the contract was, in fact, 
governed by English law, and thus no English public policy concern strictly arose). 
105 Lemenda Trading Co Ltd v African Middle East Petroleum Co Ltd [1988] 1 All ER 513. 
106 At p.521. 
107 At p.523. 
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that country. In such a situation international comity combines with English 
domestic public policy to militate against enforcement.”108 
 
Thus, the fact that the public policy was shared was sufficient to justify its 
application. This is, of course, not a case of public policy being used in the context of 
the application of a foreign law or the recognition of a foreign judgment – the case 
concerned the validity of a contract. However, the principles which it establishes seem 
equally applicable in the context of public policy in private international law. Despite 
the lack of forum proximity with the dispute, the concordance of public policy 
between the forum state and the state in which the events giving rise to the dispute 
occurred had the effect that the English courts were justified in applying public 
policy. 
4.4 Category C – Relative policies but proximate disputes 
The next category of cases is those in which the claim involves a breach of a relative 
norm, but the dispute is strongly connected to the forum state. Here, the analysis in 
this article suggests that the application of public policy may be justifiable on the 
grounds of the strong proximity of the dispute to the forum. 
 
Here we may consider, for example, the approach taken by the English courts to the 
question of validity of a foreign divorce which is lawfully obtained under foreign law, 
but not consistent with English law. Where the divorce is granted in a foreign state 
between two parties who are domiciled in that state, that is, where the dispute has a 
low proximity to England, the courts have not been prepared to apply English public 
policy to refuse recognition of the divorce109. Such cases fall within the scope of 
Category D, discussed below. Where, by contrast, one of the parties has an English 
domicile, the courts have refused recognition of the divorce through application of 
English public policy110. The justification for the application of public policy in one 
context and not in the other is clearly the differing proximity of the dispute.  
 
Other examples of this distinction may readily be identified in the practice of the 
English courts. A polygamous marriage111 entered into by parties domiciled in a 
foreign state under which such a marriage is lawful will not be refused recognition if 
the parties subsequently move to England112, but would be contrary to English law 
                                                 
108 At p.523. 
109 See, eg, El Fadl v El Fadl [2000] 1 FLR 175 (refusing to apply public policy to invalidate a Talaq 
divorce procedure contrary to English public policy but consistent with Lebanese law, between two 
parties domiciled in Lebanon, holding (at p.190) that “comity between nations and belief systems 
requires … that one country should accept the conscientiously held but very different standards of 
another where they are applied to those who are domiciled in it”). See similarly K v R [2007] EWHC 
2945 (Fam); H v H [2006] EWHC 2989 (Fam); Qureshi v Qureshi [1972] Fam 173. 
110 See, eg, Chaudhary v Chaudhary [1984] 3 All ER 1017 (in which a Talaq divorce was refused 
because the husband had obtained an English domicile). English courts have similarly applied public 
policy to refuse recognition of a Maltese decree declaring a valid English marriage between English 
domiciles to be void, despite the subsequent change in domicile of the husband (and thus, under the law 
at the time, his wife) to Malta: see Gray v Formosa [1963] P 259. 
111 For a critical perspective on the application of public policy in the context of marriage, see Murphy, 
J, “Rationality and Cultural Pluralism in the Non-Recognition of Foreign Marriages” (2000) 49 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 643. 
112 The Matrimonial Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act 1972 introduced the rule that a 
polygamous marriage is recognised for the purposes of matrimonial relief; such a marriage is also 
recognised for the purposes of succession (see, eg, Coleman v Shang [1961] AC 481); see also 
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and public policy if entered into in England113 or by an English domicile114. Similarly, 
an agreement to commit champerty, governed by a foreign law under which it is valid, 
is nevertheless contrary to the public policy of England if it refers to proceedings to 
take place in England115, but not if it refers to proceedings to take place in a state 
which permits such agreements116. In Rousillon v Rousillon (1880)117, an undertaking 
of non-competition entered into in France and governed by French law was 
nevertheless potentially subject to the limits of English public policy because it 
extended to English territory and was allegedly breached in England118. 
 
Some civil law systems have developed formalised doctrines which, reflecting this 
perspective, embody the idea of self-restraint in the imposition of domestic public 
policy in private international law disputes – doctrines which might profitably be 
adapted into English law. In French and Belgian law, public policy is limited or 
‘attenuated’ (given an effet atténué), to reflect the degree of connection between the 
dispute and the forum state, the ‘proximity’ of the dispute119. In German, Austrian and 
Swiss law, public policy is limited under a doctrine known as Inlandsbeziehung or 
Binnenbeziehung, which provides that the application of public policy should vary 
depending on the domestic effects which the dispute has in the forum state120. The 
greater the effect within the state of the regulation of the legal relationship, the 
stronger the domestic effects of the case, the more likely that public policy is to be 
applied.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Onobrauche v Onobrauche [1978] 8 Fam Law 107 (finding that a husband had not committed adultery 
by virtue of having sexual relations with multiple wives to which he was lawfully married under 
foreign law). In Mohamed v Knott [1969] 1 QB 1 a potentially polygamous Nigerian marriage between 
a girl of 13 and a man of 25 who subsequently moved to England was not found to be contrary to 
English public policy; see similarly In Re Bozzelli's Settlement [1902] 1 Ch 751. 
113 See, eg, A-M v A-M [2001] 2 FLR 6. 
114 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.11(d); see, eg, Hussain v Hussain [1983] Fam 26; Risk v Risk 
[1951] P 50. 
115 Trendtex Trading Corpn v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679; In re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [1963] Ch 
199; Grell v Levy (1864) 16 CBNS 73. These cases may alternatively be justified by the argument that 
the assignability of the chose in action (the right to litigate) is governed by the lex situs of the property, 
that is, English law. 
116 In re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [1963] Ch 199 at 218; compare the Canadian decision in National 
Surety Co v Larsen [1929] 4 DLR 918. 
117 Rousillon v Rousillon (1880) 14 Ch D 351. 
118 At p.369. 
119 Bureau, D and Muir Watt, H, “Droit international privé” (vol.1, 2007) at pp.255, 458ff; Mayer, P 
and Heuzé, V, “Droit international privé” (9th edn, 2007) at pp.151ff, 282ff; Meidanis, HP, “Public 
Policy and Ordre Public in the Private International Law of the EU: Traditional Positions and Modern 
Trends” (2005) 30 European Law Review 95 at p.97; Enonchong, N, “Public Policy in the Conflict of 
Laws: A Chinese Wall Around Little England?” (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 633 at p.659-60; Lagarde, P, “Public Policy”, Chapter 11, in Lipstein, K (ed), International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Vol III: Private International Law (1994) at [46ff]; Bucher, A, 
“L’ordre public et le but social des lois en droit international privé” (1993-II) 239 Recueil des Cours 9 
at p.47ff; Mosconi, F, “Exceptions to the Operation of Choice of Law Rules” (1989-V) 217 Recueil des 
Cours 9 at p.87ff. 
120 Lagarde, P, “Public Policy”, Chapter 11, in Lipstein, K (ed), International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, Vol III: Private International Law (1994) at [26ff]; Bucher, A, “L’ordre public et le 
but social des lois en droit international privé” (1993-II) 239 Recueil des Cours 9 at p.52ff; Mosconi, F, 
“Exceptions to the Operation of Choice of Law Rules” (1989-V) 217 Recueil des Cours 9 at p.98ff. 
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Although, as noted above121, modern open textured approaches to choice of law in the 
United States tend to subsume public policy concerns within choice of law rules, at 
least historically most case law in the United States can be interpreted to similar 
effect122. In the seminal decision of Home Insurance v Dick (1930)123, a Texan court 
was not permitted  to apply the law or the public policy of the forum to replace the 
otherwise applicable law of Mexico, because it did not have a sufficient connection 
with the dispute. Basing its reasoning on an analysis of the Due Process clause of the 
United States Constitution, the Supreme Court held that the public policy of Texas 
“may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to 
anything done or to be done within them”124. 
 
These are all, in reality, only slightly different formulations of one idea. Where a 
dispute governed by foreign law is nevertheless very closely connected to the forum 
state, local public policy may be applied relatively freely. Where the dispute is only 
connected in a very limited way125, the justification for applying local public policy is 
weaker. The application of national public policy to international disputes governed 
by foreign law should be limited according to the degree of connection, the proximity, 
of the proceedings and the forum state.  
4.5 Category D – Low proximity disputes and relative policies 
A further category concerns cases which involve both disputes with a low proximity 
and breaches of only relative norms. As these cases lack either criteria which justifies 
the application of public policy126, it is to be expected that in these cases courts should 
be most prepared to accept that a foreign law or judgment should be given effect, even 
if the result is one which is different from that which would be reached under English 
law. They should thus be cases in which the English courts refuse to apply public 
policy. 
 
The case of Saxby v Fulton (1909)127 is an illustration of the application of these 
principles. This case concerned the enforcement of a loan agreement entered into in 
Monte Carlo, for the purposes of procuring money for gambling. Such an agreement 
would have been invalid if entered into in England at the time, as contrary to English 
public policy. The question therefore arose whether it should be refused enforcement 
in England. Here, however, the dispute was largely unconnected with England – the 
agreement was entered into in Monte Carlo, the contract was (according to English 
choice of law rules) governed by the law of Monte Carlo, and the central performance 
of the agreement, the provision of money as a loan, was to be effected there. The 
court concluded that it would not be contrary to English public policy to give effect to 
the law of Monte Carlo which permitted enforcement of a loan agreement for the 
purposes of gambling – that “there is nothing contrary to public policy in allowing the 
                                                 
121 See section 3.2 above. 
122 See, eg, Paulsen, MG and Sovern, MI, “‘Public Policy’ in the Conflict of Laws” (1956) 56 
Columbia Law Review 969; Nussbaum, A, “Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of 
Laws” (1940) 49 Yale Law Journal 1027 at p.1031ff. 
123 Home Insurance v Dick (1930) 281 US 397. 
124 At p.410; see similarly Beach, JK, “Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights” (1918) 27 Yale Law 
Journal 656 at p.662ff. 
125 It is, of course, unlikely to be wholly unconnected if the forum has jurisdiction. 
126 Unless the breach is very serious – see sections 3.4 and 4.1 above. 
127 Saxby v Fulton [1909] 2 KB 208. 
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enforcement of such a contract”128. While there was a clear principle of English public 
policy contrary to gambling contracts, it was held that “a betting or gaming contract in 
a country where betting or gaming is recognized by the law cannot be said to be 
contrary to essential principles of morality or justice”129. Thus, the public policy 
which was at stake was essentially acknowledged as possessing a relative character 
and an attenuated effect. This case was distinguished from those “cases in which an 
element is present which may be summarized as something contrary to the morality of 
civilized nations, as we understand it”130 – instead, it was held that “there is nothing 
of that objectionable nature in a contract to lend money for the purpose of 
gambling”131. The relative character of the public policy at stake, together with the 
low proximity of the dispute with the forum state, meant that the application of 
English public policy was unjustified. 
 
Another case which exemplifies these principles is In re Bonacina (1912)132, which 
involved a unilateral undertaking, governed by Italian law, entered into in Italy by an 
Italian to pay a debt to another Italian. Such an undertaking would be enforceable 
according to Italian law, but would not be enforceable under English law because it 
lacked the consideration necessary to constitute a contractually binding obligation. 
Nevertheless, the English courts did give effect to the undertaking. Here again, the 
dispute was closely connected with Italy and not proximate to the forum state. The 
norm which was in dispute was clearly one with a relative character – the court 
observed that “the doctrine of consideration as it exists with us is peculiar to our 
common law; it is not to be found in the law of Italy or, so far as I am aware, in the 
law of other Continental countries which derive the principles of their jurisprudence 
in regard to contractual obligations from the Roman source”133. More generally, it was 
held that “a contract which is void (not being immoral) here may be perfectly good in 
a foreign country, and, if so, can be enforced here”134. Thus, in the absence of 
‘immorality’ (and thus a breach of a more absolute policy), the English court was not 
prepared to apply public policy to exclude the application of foreign law to an 
essentially foreign dispute, an approach which is consistent with a number of other 
cases135. 
 
It was noted above136 that, if a dispute in the English courts involves the potential 
application of the law of a state bound by the European Convention on Human Rights 
or the recognition of a judgment from such a state, public policy derived from the 
ECHR would be shared and thus more freely applicable. Where, by contrast, a 
                                                 
128 At p.230, per Buckley LJ. 
129 At p.228, per Buckley LJ. 
130 At p.232, per Kennedy LJ. 
131 At p.232, per Kennedy LJ. 
132 In re Bonacina [1912] 2 Ch 394 
133 At p.403, per Kennedy LJ. 
134 At p.402, per Farwell LJ. 
135 See, eg, Addison v Brown [1954] 2 All ER 213 (refusing to apply public policy to invalidate an 
agreement entered into in California and accepted by the courts of California which ousted the 
jurisdiction of those courts, despite the fact that such an agreement would have been void if it 
purported to oust the jurisdiction of English courts); Shrichand & Co v Lacon (1906) 22 Times LR 245 
(refusing to invalidate a contract for money-lending contrary to English law which was entered into in 
India and to be performed in India); Sottomayor v De Barros [1874-80] All ER Rep 94 (refusing to 
apply public policy to prevent application of a foreign law invalidating a marriage, where the marriage, 
although it had taken place in England, was between two foreign domiciles). 
136 See section 3.3 above. 
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judgment sought to be enforced from a non-Convention state is contrary to public 
policy derived from the ECHR which is not shared with that state, and the case lacks 
proximity with the forum, the English courts have, also consistently with the analysis 
in this article, indicated that only the most serious breaches might justify the 
invocation of public policy137. 
4.6 Category E – Intermediate cases 
The most difficult cases are those where there is some degree of proximity between 
the dispute and the forum state, but not so much that local public policy is very 
readily applicable, and the public policy at stake is not entirely shared or absolute, but 
neither is it entirely relative. Although in this context the application of public policy 
is more controversial and difficult to predict, the fact that ‘hard cases’ exist does not, 
of course, undermine the principles which have been articulated and illustrated in this 
article. 
 
The case of Vervaeke v Smith (1983)138 provides an illustration of the difficulties in 
determining whether or not to apply public policy in such an intermediate situation. 
The facts of the case are notorious. Vervaeke, a Belgian prostitute, married Smith, an 
Englishman, in 1954, entirely in order to acquire British nationality. In 1970, she 
purported to marry an Italian in Italy, who, having died at their wedding reception, 
left an estate which included a large amount of English property. Vervaeke brought 
proceedings in England seeking to have her married to Smith declared void so that her 
second marriage would be valid, and hence she would inherit. Having failed in these 
English proceedings (initially brought on fraudulent grounds), she sought the same 
order in the courts of Belgium and succeeded, on the grounds that the marriage was 
contrary to Belgian public policy. The further English proceedings which followed 
were thus, finally, an attempt to obtain recognition and enforcement in the English 
courts of the Belgian judgment invalidating the English marriage. The English court 
refused to enforce the foreign judgment, principally on the ground that the issue was 
res judicata in the English courts (because of the prior English proceedings), but also 
on the alternative ground that it was contrary to English public policy. 
 
The court noted that the issue arose because there were differing approaches in 
English and Belgian law to the question of the validity of a ‘sham’ marriage. English 
law favoured the certainty of validating any registered and formally correct marriage. 
Belgian law, by contrast, would invalidate the marriage on the grounds that it lacked 
genuine consent. This is thus clearly a situation in which there is at least a degree of 
relativity of public policy – the English policy is stronger than, for example, the 
doctrine of consideration, but clearly not an absolute moral compulsion. It is also 
clearly a situation in which the dispute is partly connected with England, is somewhat 
‘proximate’, but also has strong connections with other jurisdictions. It is therefore no 
surprise that the dispute raised difficult issues of public policy.  
                                                 
137 Government of the United States of America v Montgomery (No 2) [2004] UKHL 37 (refusing to 
apply public policy to prevent registration of a United States judgment obtained through procedures 
which would, if carried out in a Convention state, have been contrary to the ECHR). But see Pellegrini 
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 28 
 
The House of Lords, while acknowledging that public policy should only be invoked 
“with extreme reserve”139, nevertheless ultimately held (disagreeing with the decision 
at first instance and in the Court of Appeal) that the Belgian judgment did “offend the 
conscience of the court”140, and thus it would be contrary to English public policy to 
give it effect. This was, at least in part, based on the proximity of the dispute. Indeed, 
one member of the court argued expressly for the articulation of a type of proximity 
test, suggesting that the “criterion of a real and substantial connection seems to me to 
be useful and relevant in considering the choice of law for testing, if not all questions 
of essential validity, at least the question of the sort of quintessential validity in issue 
in this appeal – the question which law’s public policy should determine the validity 
of the marriage”141. It was also suggested that if English choice of law rules would 
point to English law being applicable, the court should, on this reasoning, be more 
prepared to apply English public policy to refuse enforcement of a foreign judgment 
which had applied a different law. This is a clear illustration of the idea examined 
above142 that public policy, as a special form of choice of law rule, should be under 
the same principled constraints which operate in the context of choice of law itself. 
 
While it is true that much emphasis was placed on the fact that the Belgian judgment 
depended on Belgian public policy, and thus it was a case of competing public 
policies rather than a refusal to apply a judgment based on a foreign statute, this 
remains a good illustration of the principles analysed in this article. While it was not 
an obvious case, the reasonable degree of proximity, together with the reasonably 
strong commitment of the English courts to the relevant policy, together justified the 
application of English public policy to refuse enforcement of the foreign judgment.  
 
 
5 Wrongly decided cases? 
In the analysis thus far it has been demonstrated that the practice of the English courts 
in the use of public policy in private international law is broadly consistent with the 
principles developed in this article. These principles are, however, not merely 
intended to serve an explanatory function, or to provide guidance for future decisions. 
They are also intended to suggest constraints on the operation of public policy, and 
thereby to provide a basis on which to criticise its utilisation in some circumstances. 
As long as the exercise of public policy is characterised as purely discretionary, it is 
not only difficult to predict how it will be used, it is also impossible to criticise. Some 
cases in which public policy has been applied are controversial, but critics have 
struggled to articulate principled grounds on which to object to the decision. The 
principles developed in this article give greater substance to claims that public policy 
has been misapplied in particular cases. In these cases, the use of public policy is not 
merely wrong as a matter of private international law, but arguably (for reasons 
considered above143) a breach of constitutional norms, in that the misapplication of 
public policy fails to give proper effect to the primary policy of applying foreign law 
or recognising and enforcing foreign judgments. 
                                                 
139 At p.164, per Lord Simon. 
140 At p.157, per Lord Hailsham. 
141 At p.166, per Lord Simon. 
142 See section 3.1 above. 
143 See section 2.2 above. 
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In the case of In re Macartney (1921)144, a Maltese court granted a judgment in which 
an estate was ordered to pay maintenance to an illegitimate child of the deceased, 
extending into adulthood. An English court controversially refused to recognise or 
enforce the judgment on the grounds that it (in particular, the extension of the award 
into adulthood) was contrary to public policy. Examined through the principles 
developed in this article, the dissatisfaction which is generally expressed with this 
decision may be more clearly explained. The case was one of reasonably low 
proximity to the forum state, involving the enforcement of an order involving a 
foreign estate against English assets. While the court cited Rousillon v Rousillon 
(1880)145 in support of the proposition that “this Court will not enforce a contract 
against the public policy of this country, wherever it may be made”146, that was a case 
(as examined above147) with a far greater proximity to England. Further, the norm 
which was at stake was only relative – the court acknowledged that the extension of a 
maintenance award into adulthood was not “so directly contrary to general morality as 
on that ground alone to be refused recognition in this country”148. The lack of 
proximity and the relativity of the norm together suggest that public policy ought not 
to have been applied in the circumstances of the case – they provide a principled 
ground for criticising the judgment. 
 
A more recent dispute raises similar grounds for criticism – this time involving the 
enforcement in the United States of an English judgment. In the case of Telnikoff v 
Matusevitch (1997)149, Telnikoff sued Matesevitch in the English courts for libel in 
respect of a publication in an English newspaper, and after lengthy litigation 
(including before the House of Lords150) was ultimately successful in obtaining an 
award for damages of £240,000. Before enforcement of the award could take place, 
Matusevitch moved to the United States, and Telnikoff thus attempted enforcement of 
the judgment there. Although codified in statute151, the principles applicable to the 
recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment were broadly equivalent to those 
in England – including the possibility for the refusal of enforcement on the grounds of 
public policy. After the claim for enforcement was denied at first instance, the dispute 
came before the Court of Appeal of Maryland. The question was characterised as 
“whether Telnikoff’s English libel judgment is based upon principles which are so 
contrary to Maryland’s public policy concerning freedom of the press and defamation 
actions that recognition of the judgment should be denied”152. After reviewing the 
facts of the case in detail, and the diverging histories of libel law and freedom of the 
press protection in England and the United States (particularly drawing on United 
States First Amendment constitutional jurisprudence), the court emphasised that the 
                                                 
144 In Re Macartney [1921] 1 Ch 522. 
145 Rousillon v Rousillon (1880) 14 Ch D 351. 
146 At p.369. 
147 See section 4.4 above. 
148 In Re Macartney [1921] 1 Ch 522 at 527. 
149 Telnikoff v Matusevitch, 702 A2d 230 (Md 1997). See generally Berman, PS, “Choice of Law and 
Jurisdiction on the Internet – Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining 
Governmental Interests in a Global Era” (2005) 153 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1819 at 
p.1871; Youm, KH, “The Interaction Between American and Foreign Libel Law” (2000) 49 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 131. 
150 Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1992] 2 AC 343 
151 Maryland Code, Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition (s.10-701ff). 
152 Telnikoff v Matusevitch, 702 A2d 230 (Md 1997) at 239. 
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judgment would not have been awarded if Maryland law had been applicable to the 
dispute, and concluded that: 
 
“The principles governing defamation actions under English law, which were 
applied to Telnikoff’s libel suit, are so contrary to Maryland defamation law, 
and to the policy of freedom of the press underlying Maryland law, that 
Telnikoff’s judgment should be denied recognition under principles of comity. 
In the language of the Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act, 
§10-704(b)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Telnikoff’s 
English ‘cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the 
public policy of the State…’”153 
 
What is striking and controversial about this decision is that First Amendment 
standards were applied to refuse enforcement of a judgment almost entirely 
unconnected with the United States154. To put this another way, the dispute lacked 
proximity with the courts of Maryland, and thus the parochial application of public 
policy here looks like an attempt to give extraterritorial effect to United States 
norms155. In reaching its decision, the court relied extensively on the case of 
Bachchan v India Abroad Publications (1992)156 – although this was notably a case in 
which part of the publication took place in New York, and a failure to apply United 
States constitutional norms might thus potentially affect freedom of the press in the 
United States. In Telnikoff, by contrast, to cite the sole dissenting judge, “there is no 
United States or Maryland interest implicated by this judgment”157.  
 
According to the analysis in this article, public policy might, despite the absence of 
proximity, nevertheless be applicable if the norm at stake was shared or absolute. The 
differences between United States and English law in this field and the unique 
character of First Amendment jurisprudence in the United States do not suggest that 
either of these grounds could justify the decision of the court. As the dissent argued, 
“this libel judgment obtained by one British resident against another British resident 
was not a ‘serious injustice’; it does not violate fundamental notions of what is decent 
and just; and it does not undermine public confidence in the administration of law”158. 
The fact that Matusevitch, an England resident at the time, was subject to English 
libel law in respect of a suit by another English resident concerning a publication in 
an English newspaper cannot of itself be fundamentally objectionable to Maryland 
public policy – and his subsequent move to Maryland should not change this.  
 
The constitutional perspective examined earlier in this article noted that public policy 
ought to be balanced against other policies, such as those embodied in choice of law 
                                                 
153 Telnikoff v Matusevitch, 702 A2d 230 (Md 1997) at 249. 
154 Matusevitch was born in New York, but after moving to Russia at aged four lived in various 
European countries, finally living in England at the time of the defamation, before moving to the 
United States. 
155 For a critical view from a constitutional perspective see Rosen, MD, “Exporting the Constitution” 
(2004) 53 Emory Law Journal 171. 
156 Bachchan v India Abroad Publications, 585 NYS 2d 661 (1992). See Devgun, D, “United States 
Enforcement of English Defamation Judgments: Exporting the First Amendment?” (1994) 23 Anglo-
American Law Review 195; Maltby, J, “Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The Enforcement of 
Foreign Libel Judgments in US Courts” (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 1978. 
157 Telnikoff v Matusevitch, 702 A2d 230 (Md 1997) at 258, per Chasanow J. 
158 At p.256, per Chasanow J. 
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or judgment recognition rules, particularly (but not exclusively) where they were 
policies adopted by parliament in the form of a statute159. Consistently with this 
approach, the dissenting judge in this case noted that: 
 
“Our interest in international good will, comity, and res judicata fostered by 
recognition of foreign judgments must be weighed against our minimal interest 
in giving the benefits of our local libel public policy to residents of another 
country who defame foreign public figures in foreign publications and who have 
no reasonable expectation that they will be protected by the Maryland 
Constitution”.160  
 
The case is rightly controversial because it appears to undermine the policy behind the 
rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments – public policy was 
applied in a case without proximity to the forum state to give effect to a clearly 
relative norm, violating the basic principle of tolerance of difference which underpins 
private international law. 
 
 
6 A residual discretion? 
The purpose of this article has been to articulate rules, largely consistent with the 
existing practice of the courts, which can be used to guide the application of public 
policy. To this extent, it rejects the view that the use of public policy by the courts is 
inherently discretionary. However, this is perhaps subject to one important 
qualification. The courts may retain a discretion to refuse the application of public 
policy, even if the dispute falls within the range of cases in which the application of 
public policy is justifiable. According to this approach, where the application of 
public policy might itself cause an injustice, the courts may refuse to apply it161.  
 
The perceived need for such a discretion is easily illustrated. Consider, for example, a 
couple who marry in a foreign state, contrary to a law which forbids their marriage on 
racially discriminatory grounds, and then subsequently move to England162. If one 
party was later to seek to assert rights to maintenance or inheritance in an English 
court, it is highly likely that the court would apply English public policy to invalidate 
the discriminatory foreign law, upholding the marriage. If, however, the couple 
amicably separated and one party remarried relying on the foreign law invalidating 
the initial marriage, it is at least arguable that the court should not apply public policy 
to deny effect to the discriminatory foreign law, as it could cause an injustice between 
the parties. 
 
Whether such a residual discretion should operate is a difficult question. It is related 
to the uncertainty, noted above163, as to whether public policy operates against a 
                                                 
159 See section 2.2 above. 
160 At p.257, per Chasanow J. 
161 But see Mann, FA, “The Consequences of an International Wrong in International and National 
Law” (1976-7) 48 British Yearbook of International Law 1 at p.45 (arguing that such a discretion 
should not operate in respect of truly international public policy). 
162 See, eg, Carter, PB, “The Role of Public Policy in English Private International Law” (1993) 42 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1 at p.4. 
163 See section 3.1 above. 
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foreign law per se, or only the outcome of the application of the foreign law in the 
specific circumstances. Any optional provision for excluding public policy on the 
grounds of justice would clearly risk reintroducing the criticised discretionary 
character of the public policy exception. Even if it exists, however, the existence of 
such a residual discretion would not undermine the need for the development of 
principles limiting the application of public policy – even if they are subject to 
additional limitations, the principles examined in this article would still establish 
when public policy may or may not be invoked by the courts. 
 
 
7 Conclusions 
The doctrine of public policy serves a fundamentally important function in 
demarcating the limits of the principles of tolerance underpinning rules on the 
application of foreign law and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
However, it has been, not unfairly, much criticised for its vagueness and uncertainty 
of application and for its discretionary character. There are clear justifications for 
limits on the use of public policy in private international law, including constitutional 
concerns. Such limits are essential to avoid public policy becoming “an intolerable 
affectation of superior virtue”164 or even an instance of “cultural imperialism”165, 
undermining the system of mutual respect, of tolerance, which is at the heart of 
private international law. This article argues that these justifications can be examined 
to assist in formulating guidelines for when it is appropriate for public policy to be 
invoked to refuse an application of foreign law or the recognition and enforcement of 
a foreign judgment. 
 
The principles identified in this article suggest that the application of public policy 
should reflect three concerns. First, as a subsidiary form of choice of law rule, it 
should reflect the degree of proximity of the dispute with the forum state. Second, the 
willingness to apply public policy should reflect the relativity of the norm which is 
breached – the extent to which it is shared with other interested states or absolute 
(ought to be shared). Where shared or absolute norms are involved, such as when 
public policy is sourced from European or international law, it is transformed from a 
negative exclusionary doctrine to a positive mechanism for enforcing those norms. In 
this context, however, an additional concern may arise – public policy may be limited 
as a consequence of the need for deference to other means of enforcement (such as 
specialised regional courts). Third, public policy should be more easily invoked 
depending on the seriousness of the breach.  
 
Representing these principles as dimensions on a ‘map’ allows a diagrammatic 
analysis of the limits of tolerance in private international law, which provides an 
important framework for the examination of the practice of the English courts. The 
proximity of the dispute and the shared or absolute character of a norm are each 
justifications for the application of that norm as part of public policy. If both are 
present in a high degree, then the application of public policy is clearly justified 
(Category A). If neither is present in a high degree, then it is clearly not justified 
                                                 
164 Beach, JK, “Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights” (1918) 27 Yale Law Journal 656 at p.662 
(writing in the context of disputes within the United States). 
165 Murphy, J, “Rationality and Cultural Pluralism in the Non-Recognition of Foreign Marriages” 
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(Category D). If only one is present, then it must be present in a high degree to justify 
public policy (Category B or C). If, however, both are present in an intermediate 
degree, their combination may provide a compelling basis on which to invoke public 
policy (Category E). 
 
The analysis in this article suggests that, although the English courts have not 
articulated guidelines restraining the use of public policy, the case law is broadly 
consistent with principled limits. These principles do not only assist in explaining the 
general practice of the courts, but also provide a basis for analysing why in some 
cases the application of public policy has been viewed as erroneous. It is, of course, 
not suggested that courts have in the past, or ever will in future, use public policy in a 
way which is entirely predictable or rule-driven. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the 
framework articulated in this article might help provide guidance for future cases, 
making the application of public policy in private international law more certain, 
principled and justifiable. 
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